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NOTICE PROBLEMS IN THE DOUBLE-PLEDGE SITUATION:
CAN A JUNIOR PLEDGEE GIVE NOTICE OF A
SECURITY INTEREST TO A PLEDGEE-
BAILEE UNDER SECTION 9-305 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE?
INTRODUCTION
Section 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or the Code)
provides that a secured party may perfect his security interest in collat-
eral by taking possession of the collateral.' When the debtor's property
is already in the hands of a third person, however, a security interest in
the property also may be perfected through notice to the third party in
2possession.
Section 9-305 of the U.C.C. is silent as to which party, the debtor or
the secured party, must give notice to a third party bailee.3 The Restate-
ment of Security,4 U.C.C. commentators, and earlier cases clearly indi-
cate that notice may come from either the debtor or the secured party.5
A new trend has developed in the law, however, with respect to the iden-
tity of the notice-giver, particularly in situations where the third party
bailee is also a secured party holding for himself. This new view requires
notice from the debtor as the only means of perfecting a junior security
interest.6
The reasons presented for concluding that notice must come from the
pledgor in a double-pledge situation7 are three-fold: to modify the origi-
1. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978) states: "A security interest in letters of credit and advices
of credit .... goods, instruments (other than certificated securities), money, negotiable
documents, or chattel paper may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of
the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-304(1) provides that a security interest in money or instru-
ments can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession. It should be noted,
however, that for most types of collateral, possession is only one method of perfection.
The secured party also may file a financing statement in most instances. See U.C.C. § 9-
304 official comment 1 (1978) (emphasis added); infra note 18 and accompanying text.
2. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978), which provides in pertinent part: "If such collateral
other than goods covered by a negotiable document is held by a bailee, the secured party
is deemed to have possession from the time the bailee receives notification of the secured
party's interest."
3. See id See infra note 43.
4. See Restatement of Security (1941).
5. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
7. The phrase "double-pledge situation" is used throughout this Note to refer to the
situation where a debtor grants a security interest in collateral to a first secured party,
who takes possession, and then grants a second interest in the same collateral to another
secured party, who then acquires, or attempts to acquire, constructive possession through
the notice provision of U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978). The double-pledge situation is possible
when the value of the collateral is great enough to cover two separate payment obliga-
tions.
The delivery of collateral to a secured party for purposes of perfecting a security inter-
est was called a "pledge" at common law. See infra note 23. Although the Uniform
Commercial Code codifies the common law theory of pledges in its sections relating to
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nal bailment/pledge agreement between the pledgor and senior pledgee;
to release control over the pledgor's equity interest in collateral enabling
the junior pledgee to acquire common law "possession;" and to protect
the pledgor from interference by fraudulent claimants.8
Notwithstanding that the arguments presented by some courts and re-
cent commentators are persuasive and logically appealing, the position
that notice must come from the pledgor is unwise and impractical. The
better position is that notice to a pledgee-bailee may come from either the
pledgor or the junior pledgee.
Part I of this Note introduces the concept of possessory security inter-
ests and its underlying principles. Part II presents the split of authority
with respect to the identity of the notice-giver, discusses the arguments
for requiring notice from the pledgor in the context of a key case, In re
Kontaratos,9 and of newly revised Article 8 of the U.C.C., and suggests
reasons why requiring notice from the pledgor is an unwise and impracti-
cal position, and perhaps also analytically unsound. Finally, this Note
concludes that allowing either the pledgor or the junior pledgee to notify
the pledgee-bailee is a more sensible position, both analytically and in
terms of commercial practicality.
I. INTRODUCTION TO POSSESSORY SECURITY INTERESTS
The U.C.C. defines a "security interest" as any "interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion."" ° Article 9, which governs secured transactions, distinguishes be-
tween "perfected" and "unperfected" security interests." According to
the U.C.C., a security interest is "perfected" when the secured party has
taken whatever steps are required by the Code to give him such an
interest. 2
perfection through possession, see id., the U.C.C. does not retain the common law termi-
nology. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d); § 9-105(1)(m) & official comment 1 (1978). Because
this Note deals with pre-Code security law as well as U.C.C. law, however, the term
"pledge" will be retained, and the terms "pledgor, .... senior pledgee" and "junior
pledgee" will be used to refer to the debtor, the first secured party and the second secured
party, respectively.
8. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text; infra notes 93-111 and accompany-
ing text; and infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
9. 10 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
10. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978). Generally, there are three requirements for creating
an enforceable security interest: a security agreement containing a description of the
collateral signed by the debtor, the existence of the debtor's rights in the collateral, and
the giving of value by the secured party. See id. § 9-203. A transfer of physical posses-
sion (i.e. the pledge), however, can substitute for the first requirement. See id.
11. See U.C.C. § 9-303 & official comment 1 (1978); U.C.C. § 9-301 official comment
1 (1978).
12. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1978). The applicable steps required for perfection are speci-
fied in U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306 (1978). See U.C.C. § 9-303(1).
The U.C.C. does not actually define the term "perfection." The decision not to define
the term, however, was a conscious choice on the part of the drafters of Article 9. At the
time of the 1972 revision of Article 9, the review committee stated that "[i]t would be
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The term "perfected" describes a security interest in personal property
that cannot be defeated in insolvency proceedings or by general credi-
tors. 3 Thus, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights
of anyone with a perfected interest, or anyone who becomes a lien credi-
tor'4 before the security interest becomes perfected."5
The key effect of subordination of an unperfected security interest to
lien creditors is that the interest is not good as against the pledgor's
trustee in bankruptcy. 6 Thus, in any loan transaction, the perfection of
the creditor's security interest is essential to ensure that the creditor re-
ceives the collateral in the event the pledgor defaults or files for
bankruptcy.'
7
Article 9 of the U.C.C. provides for basically two methods of perfect-
ing a security interest: by filing a financing statement" or by taking pos-
session of collateral.1 9 This Note deals exclusively with the possessory
method of perfection.
unwise to attempt a formal definition of perfection, because of the subtlety of the
problems involved in rights against many groups of third persons." U.C.C. Appendix II,
General Comment on the Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9, E-16 at 889
(1978).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-301 official comment 1 (1978).
14. A "lien creditor" under the U.C.C. is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of
creditors... and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a
receiver in equity from the time of appointment." U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1978).
15. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a), (b) (1978).
16. This is because the definition of lien creditor in U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1978) includes
a trustee in bankruptcy. See 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property
§ 14.2, at 435 (1965); U.C.C. § 9-303 official comment I ("[I]n general after perfection
the secured party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and in par-
ticular against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or
against the debtor.").
17. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978), which provides that upon default, a secured party has
the right to take possession of collateral, if he is not already in possession as a pledgee,
"without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace." This is the
standard Code remedy in cases of default, where the debtor seeks to regain the collateral.
See U.C.C. 9-503 & and official comment; T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Com-
mentary and Law Digest 9-501[A][3], at 9-304 (1978) (discussing Code remedies in
general); ia 9-503[A][1]-[8], at 9-311 to -319 (discussing problems that have arisen out
of this self-help repossession provision). U.C.C. § 9-504 further provides that after de-
fault a secured party in possession of collateral may then sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of it in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest. The only restric-
tion placed on the secured party is that the method of disposition must be "commercially
reasonable." See U.C.C. § 9-504 official comment 1 (1978). This is a powerful remedy
for any creditor with a perfected interest.
18. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1978).
19. U.C.C. § 9-304 official comment 1 (1978) ("For most types of property, filing and
taking possession are alternative methods of perfection."). It should be noted that the
U.C.C. does provide for a third method of perfection, which is used often and is also
extremely important in commercial finance. U.C.C. § 9-304(4)-(5) allows for temporary
perfection of security interests in instruments and negotiable documents although there
has been no filing and the debtor is in possession of the collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-304(4)-
(5) (1978), and U.C.C. § 9-302 allows for full, automatic perfection, without filing or
possession, in six specific instances. See U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(b)-(g) (1978).
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The Code provides that a security interest may be perfected by the
secured party's taking possession of the collateral." The drafters of the
U.C.C., however, essentially intended sections of Article 9 relating to
perfection through possession to be a codification of the common law
theory of pledges.2
At common law, a creditor normally took physical possession of col-
lateral in order to perfect his interest.22 The delivery of the collateral to
the secured party or his agent by the debtor was called a "pledge."23
The basic concern underlying the pledge is that the pledgor must not
20. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978).
21. As the court in In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 147 n.20 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976), stated: "The perfection-by-
possession sections of Article 9 share a common heritage in the prior law of pledge." See
also I P. Coogan, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3.14[3],
at 3B-8 to -9 (1986) [hereinafter 1 Secured Transactions] ("Despite the fact that its drafts-
men set out to abandon much of the existing chattel security law, almost every important
concept, rule, or mechanism of Article 9 finds its origin in at least one of those separate
bodies of chattel security law."). Hence, it is appropriate to refer to common law princi-
ples as well as Code principles in any analysis or discussion of § 9-305 possessory security
interests. See 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 16, § 14.1, at 439; U.C.C. § 9-205 official com-
ment 6 (1978) ("The common law rules on the degree and extent of possession which are
necessary to perfect a pledge interest ... are not relaxed by this or any other section of
this Article."); U.C.C. § 9-302 official comment 2 (1978) ("As at common law, there is no
requirement of filing when the secured party has possession of the collateral in a pledge
transaction ... , Section 9-305 should be consulted on what collateral may be pledged
and on the requirements of possession."); U.C.C. § 9-304 official comment 1 (1978)
("[W]here the collateral consists of instruments, it is universal practice for the secured
party to take possession of them in pledge."); U.C.C. § 9-305 official comment 1 (1978)
("As under the common law of pledge, no filing is required by this Article to perfect a
security interest where the secured party has possession of the collateral."). U.C.C. § 9-
101 official comment (1978) states that "[p]re-Code law recognized a wide variety of
security devices, which came into use at various times to make possible different types of
secured financing." Under Article 9, however, the traditional "distinctions based on
form (except as between pledge and non-possessory interests) are no longer controlling."
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, § 9-102(3) provides that Article 9 does not abolish existing
security devices, U.C.C. § 9-102(3) (1978), and § 1-103 provide that common law rules
were intended to supplement Code provisions. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
22. See Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 Yale L.J. 1012, 1014
(1978) [hereinafter Article 9-Agenda] ("Until the early nineteenth century, the only way
to create a valid security interest in personal property was by physical pledge .... "); 1 G.
Gilmore, supra note 16, § 2.1, at 24 ("Until early in the nineteenth century the only
security devices which were known in our legal system were the mortgage of real prop-
erty and the pledge of chattels .... A transfer of an interest in personal property without
delivery of possession was looked on as being in essence a fraudulent conveyance, invalid
against creditors and purchasers."). The requirement that a creditor take possession
dated from 1601, when the court in Twyne's Case concluded that grants of security inter-
ests without a corresponding transfer of possession were "always a badge of fraud."
Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811 n.(B) (Star Chamber 1601); see also
Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 477 (1877) (possession is the essence of the pledge); Pierce
v. National Bank of Commerce, 268 F. 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1920) (pledge without delivery
is ineffectual, though possession may also be by a third person).
23. "The requirement that a secured party take possession of his collateral" exists in
Anglo-American law "under the name of pledge." I G. Gilmore, supra note 16, § 14.1,
at 438. See generally supra note 22 (collecting cases and commentators that discuss re-
quirements of common law pledge).
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be able to pass off goods as his own.2 4 By taking possession of the collat-
eral, the secured party demonstrates the ostensible ownership that indi-
cates the perfected security interest to other potential creditors. 5 The
pledgor's lack of possession, together with actual possession by the
pledgee or his agent, effectively provides notice to prospective third party
creditors that the pledgor no longer has unfettered use of his property.26
The U.C.C. does not define "possession" in Article 9.' Since the
Code does not define possession, pre-Code law provides a workable defi-
nition.2" Pre-Code security law construed possession to mean physical
control.29 Given the public notice function30 underlying the pledge, the
24. See Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). In
Twyne's Case, the court stated that "a secret transfer is always a badge of fraud," id. at
80 b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 811 n.(B), and that "by reason of [the pledgor's continued posses-
sion] ... he traded and trafficked with others, and defrauded and deceived them." Id. at
81 a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 812-13. See also Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d
974, 977 (2d Cir. 1945) ("delivery should be all that the situation permits of at the time to
remove the property from the ostensible ownership of the pledgor"); Pierce v. National
Bank of Commerce, 268 F. 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1920) (possession of collateral by pledgee
necessary so as not to give the pledgor a "false credit"); I G. Gilmore, supra note 16,
§ 14.2, at 440.
25. See Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In re Automated Bookbinding
Servs.), 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972); accord Transport Equip. Co. v. Guaranty State
Bank, 518 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1975); McDonald v. National Bank of Stigler (In re
Hill), 7 Bankr. 433, 435-36 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980). See also supra note 24.
26. See Heinicke Instruments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir.
1976) (quoting In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 151 (D. Del. 1975)). See IA Secured
Transactions, supra note 21, § 6C.08[1], at 6C-124 to -125.
27. See Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In re Automated Bookbinding
Servs.), 471 F.2d 546, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1972) ("'Possession' is one of the few terms em-
ployed by the Code for which it provides no definition."); In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr.
956, 969 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) ("Possession is not a defined term under the Uniform
Commercial Code.").
28. Where the U.C.C. is silent on a point of law, common law principles are used to
supplement the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
29. According to the Restatement of Security § 1, at 6 (1941), a person who is in
"possession of a chattel is one who ... has physical control of a chattel with the intent to
exercise such control in his behalf." See Transport Equip. Co. v. Guaranty State Bank,
518 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In
re Automated Bookbinding Servs.), 471 F.2d 546, 553 (4th Cir. 1972)); Finance Co. of
Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In re Automated Bookbinding Servs.), 471 F.2d 546, 553
(4th Cir. 1972) (quoting the Restatement of Security § 1 (1941)); McDonald v. National
Bank of Stigler (In re Hill), 7 Bankr. 433, 435-36 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980) (citing Trans-
port Equip. Co., 518 F.2d at 381); see also In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 969 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1981) ("[I]n order faithfully to apply UCC § 9-305 in service of its public notice
function 'possession' must be construed to mean 'control.' ").
30. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; see also Article 9-Agenda. supra
note 22, at 1030-33. In his article on Article 9, Professor Coogan describes "public no-
tice" as the touchstone of possessory security interests under the Code, but nevertheless
wryly notes:
The text of Article 9 does not, unfortunately, specifically articulate the 'public
notice' requirement. Professor Homer Kripke, in the early days of Article 9,
once casually mentioned the desirability of a phrase such as 'giving (or excus-
ing) public notice,' but neither he nor I followed this up at a time when it could
easily have been done. Logically, of course, this underlying rationale is obvious;
1987]
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reason for equating possession with control is clear. The indicia of own-
ership that go along with possession are demonstrated through simple
physical control. One who controls collateral possesses it, and leads
others to believe it is his.31 Hence, a pledgee must exercise complete
control over the collateral to have a perfected possessory security
interest.32
When collateral is already in the hands of a third person, however,
both the common law and the U.C.C. validate possession by the third
person as a means of perfecting a secured party's interest.33 Section 8 of
the Restatement of Security states that when collateral is in the posses-
sion of a third person, a pledge may be created upon assent of the pledgor
and notification of the third person by either the pledgor or pledgee of
the new security interest. 34 Section 9-305 of the U.C.C. similarly pro-
vides that "[i]f ... collateral ... is held by a bailee, the secured party is
deemed to have possession from the time the bailee receives notification
of the secured party's interest.
35
Taken at face value, sections 8 of the Restatement and 9-305 of the
U.C.C. seem to suggest that possession by almost any third person will
suffice to give the public notice of the security interest.3 6 The official
comment to section 9-305, however, contains an important qualification
with respect to who can be a section 9-305 bailee.37 Although possession
may be by an agent acting on the secured party's behalf, the debtor or a
person controlled by him cannot qualify as the agent for the secured
party.38 Thus, equating possession with control is equally applicable in
the context of perfection through third party possession.39
otherwise, the sponsors might as well have required secured parties to stand on
their heads or look toward Mecca or perform some other ritual in order to
perfect their security interests.
Id. at 1032 n.75. The goal of protecting potential creditors from attempts by a debtor to
portray property as unencumbered is hereinafter referred to as the "public notice func-
tion" of the U.C.C.
31. See McDonald v. National Bank of Stigler (In re Hill), 7 Bankr. 433, 435-36
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980) (citing Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In re
Automated Bookbinding Servs.), 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972)).
32. See supra notes 24-26 & 29-31 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 39 and ac-
companying text.
33. See Restatement of Security § 8 (1941); U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978). See T. Quinn,
supra note 17, 1 9-305[A][1], at S9-235 (1986 Supp. No. 2); see, e.g., Gins v. Mauser
Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1945) ("delivery to or possession by a
third party is sufficient to perfect [a] ... pledge interest"); Schram v. Sage, 46 F. Supp.
381, 383 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (citing the Restatement of Security § 8 (1941)).
34. See Restatement of Security § 8 (1941).
35. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978).
36. See T. Quinn, supra note 17, % 9-305[A][1], at S9-235 (1986 Supp. No. 2).
37. Id.
38. U.C.C. § 9-305 official comment 2 (1978); see Restatement of Security § 11 com-
ment b (1941).
39. The reason for equating possession with control in the context of perfecting a
security interest through third party possession is clear. "Where the debtor controls the
bailee, he controls the collateral notwithstanding its physical possession by the bailee,"
[Vol. 55
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In the situation where a pledgor already has transferred property to a
bailee, any logical inconsistencies between providing for perfection by no-
tice to the pledgor's bailee and the strict common law requirement that
the pledgee be in absolute control of pledged property were resolved at
common law by means of a legal fiction-upon receipt of notice the
bailee became the pledgee's agent.4
Thus, a secured party may acquire a perfected possessory interest upon
notice to a third party bailee in actual possession, provided the bailee is
independent of and not controlled by the pledgor. Perfection of the se-
curity interest occurs when the bailee receives notification of the
interest.4 '
hence the bailment does not satisfy the public notice requirement of U.C.C. § 9-305
(1978). In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 969 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). Therefore, although
possession by the pledgee may be accomplished through the use of an agent, the pledgee
must have absolute dominion and control over the property. See Qualley v. Snoqualmie
Valley Bank, 136 Wash. 42, 48, 238 P. 915, 917 (1925); see, eg., Motobecane Am., Ltd. v.
Patrick Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1248, 1252 (6th Cir. 1986) (general partner in partner-
ship owed fiduciary duty to other partners, and, therefore, could not act as bailee for
creditor of limited partner); Heinicke Instruments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700,
702 (9th Cir. 1976) (corporation could not be bailee of its own stock on behalf of creditor
bank where debtor was its former president and corporation continued to follow his di-
rections); McDonald v. National Bank of Stigler (In re Hill), 7 Bankr. 433, 436 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1980) (father of debtor could not be deemed agent for creditor). As Professor
Gilmore stated: "[I]t has been frozen law for fifty years that the possession which per-
fects a pledge is that of the pledgee himself or of some third party who is independent of
the pledgor." 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 16, § 14.2, at 440 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
40. See In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 149 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd in part and va-
cated in part, 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976); see Robinson v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of
Tulsa, 31 F. Supp. 350, 351 (N.D. Okla. 1940) ("possession of the instrument by the first
pledgee may be regarded as possession of the second pledgee, through the agency of the
former"); First Nat'l Bank of Waterloo v. Bacon, 113 A.D. 612, 614, 98 N.Y.S. 717, 719
(1906) ("possession by the first pledgee might be regarded as the possession of the second
pledgee through the agency of the former"), aff'd, 189 N.Y. 533 (1907), aff'd sub non.
Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank of Waterloo, 216 U.S. 134 (1910); see also Restatement of
Security § 8 comment a, at 24 (1941) (discussing creation of agency relationship without
consent of bailee).
To facilitate credit transactions involving third party bailees further, the common law
even denied the pledgor's bailee any right to accept or reject the imposition of such an
agency relationship:
While ordinarily an agency cannot be created without consent of the agent (Re-
statement of Agency, § 15) it is not considered desirable to require the consent
of the third person as a condition precedent to the creation of the pledge. The
third person's duties are not altered in any material respect by the pledge. To
make the third person's consent a test of the creation of the pledge would invest
him with an arbitrary power of affecting the interests of the other parties.
Restatement of Security § 8 comment a, at 24 (1941).
41. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Terminology is defined very pre-
cisely in the Code, particularly with respect to notice provisions. The U.C.C. distin-
guishes between the terms "notifies" and receives notification. See U.C.C. § 1-201 official
comment 26 (1978). "Notifies" is used "when the essential fact is the proper dispatch of
the notice, not its receipt." Idl However, "[w]hen the essential fact is the other party's
receipt of the notice, that is stated." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, use of the phrase "re-
ceives notification," in § 9-305 is significant. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978).
1987]
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II. THE TREND TOWARD REQUIRING NOTICE FROM THE PLEDGOR
Section 9-305 of the U.C.C. states that a security interest in collateral
may be perfected through notice to a third party in possession of the
collateral.42 Section 9-305, however, is silent as to which party must give
notice to the third party bailee.4"
The commentators, the Restatement of Security, and earlier cases
clearly indicate that notice may come from either the pledgor or the se-
cured party.' Indeed, the law was so clear that later commentators sim-
ply assumed that notice from a junior pledgee was sufficient to perfect an
interest.'-
42. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978).
43. See id.; Aronstein, Security Interests in Securities: How Code Revision Reflects
Modern Security-Holding Practices, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 289, 294 (1978) [hereinafter Modern
Security-Holding Practices] ("statute provides no guidance as to the form the notification
must take or, indeed, who must originate the notice"). In the early stages of drafting the
Code, many sections underwent major revisions, and the drafters carefully documented
the reasons for the changes. See Foreward to 1972 Official Text and Comments, U.C.C.
at XXXVII (1978) ("In Part II the sections of the prior Official Draft that have been
revised are set forth in a form that shows the original text and the changes now approved
and recommended for uniform enactment, together with a statement of the reasons for
change."); Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1016 n.9 (1979) [hereinafter In-
vestment Securities] ("Willingness of the U.C.C. sponsors to consider changes has been an
element of strength with the Code."). Section 9-305, however, has remained essentially
intact throughout the drafting process. See U.C.C. § 9-305 in Appendices I & II, U.C.C.
1978 Official Text. The drafters simply never viewed the ambiguity with respect to the
identity of the notice-giver as a problem.
44. For example, Professor Grant Gilmore, the principal architect of Article 9, see
Article 9-An Agenda, supra note 22, at 1012 n.1, was clear on the point: "[Plerfection
occurs when the third person receives notification, from either pledgor or pledgee, of the
pledgee's interest . 1. " I G. Gilmore, supra note 16, § 14.2, at 440 (emphasis added).
Also, the Restatement of Security states:
Where the chattel is in the possession of a third person a pledge may be created
by assent of the pledgor and notification by either pledgor or pledgee, to the
third person, that the chattel has been pledged to the pledgee.
See Restatement of Security § 8 (1941) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Gins v. Mauser
Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing the Rest. of Security § 8
(1941)); Schram v. Sage, 46 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (same); see also Invest-
ment Securities, supra note 43, at 1027 ("person could formerly perfect a security interest
in [collateral] by giving notice to the pledgee in possession under section 9-305"); cf In re
Hinds, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 1024, 89 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343 (1970) ("Since there is no
requirement that the secured party personally give notice, only that the bailee receive it,
appellant's security interest was perfected on or about [the date] when [the bailee] pre-
sumably received the letter [notifying him of security interest].") (citations omitted).
45. Professor Barkley Clark, for example, in his treatise on the law of secured trans-
actions, gave a hypothetical to explain the section 9-305 "bailee with notice" concept in
which a junior lender perfected its security interest by sending a letter to a senior lender
in possession of collateral. He stated:
Bank B [junior lender] could send a letter to Bank A [senior lender] indicating
its security interest and requesting that the stock certificates be delivered to
Bank B immediately upon repayment of the loan from Bank A.... Based on the
language of § 9-305, a court should treat Bank A as a 'bailee with notice' hold-
ing the stock not only for itself, but as agent for the subordinated secured party.
NOTICE IN THE DOUBLE-PLEDGE
Recently, however, the district court in In re Kontaratos"6 held that to
perfect a junior security interest, when the bailee in possession is actually
a pledgee himself, notice of the security interest must come from the
pledgor.47 Three other courts to date have adopted the reasoning of the
court in Kontaratos,48 as part of what seems to be a trend toward requir-
ing notice from the pledgor.
In holding that notice must come from the pledgor, Judge Cyr,49 who
wrote the Kontaratos opinion, drew on the law of bailments and the com-
mon law "control" concept embodied in the pre-Code definition of pos-
session. According to Judge Cyr, notice must come from the pledgor in
order to accomplish two things: first, it effects a modification of the orig-
inal bailment contract between the pledgor and the senior pledgee in pos-
session, and second, it is a mechanism whereby the debtor relinquishes
control over the part of the collateral in which the junior pledgee is try-
ing to perfect an interest. In developing his analysis, Judge Cyr inter-
wove the two arguments to present a unique challenge to existing law.
For reasons other than those presented by Judge Cyr in Kontaratos,
B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code"
7.7[2], at 7-16 to -17 (1980).
Similarly, in his article on security interests under revised Article 8, Professor Coogan
gives a hypothetical in which he simply assumes that notice from a junior pledgee would
perfect a security interest. Coogan was concerned instead with the difficulty of proving
receipt of notice by a recalcitrant and uncooperative pledgee-bailee. See Investment Se-
curities, supra note 43, at 1029-30.
46. 10 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
In the 1986 supplement to his book on the law of secured transactions, Professor Bar-
kley Clark mentions the decision in Kontaratos as an "interesting application of the
'double pledge' situation," but does not voice an opinion as to the validity of the argu-
ments presented in favor of requiring notice from the debtor. Instead, Clark simply notes
that "[u]nder such a holding, the subordinate creditor in the example in the main volume
could never be sure of its perfected status unless all three parties agreed to the arrange-
ment." B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code 7.7[2], at S7-6 (1986 Supp. No. 3) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 970.
48. See Landmark Land Co. v. Sprague, 529 F. Supp. 971, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (in-
structions from pledgor to senior creditor regarding the junior security interest deemed
sufficient to perfect junior interest), rev'd on other grounds; 701 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1983);
In re Baquet, 61 Bankr. 495, 501 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (court accepting Kontaratos,
and in this case since there was no notification by the debtor there was no perfection); In
re Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr. 830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (citing Kontaratos). One
unpublished district court opinion even seems to have foreshadowed Kontaratos. See
Winnett v. Inverness Counsel, Inc., No. 76 Civ. 3810 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1979) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (court held that notice from junior pledgee to
pledgee-bailee was insufficient to create perfected security interest), aff'd without opinion,
614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979); see also In re Milam, 4 Bankr. 621, 622 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1980) (on issue of whether oral notice to bailee by creditor was sufficient to perfect inter-
est, court held that "minimal step reasonably required would have been some form of
written notice by the plaintiff [creditor] and debtor (bailor)" to the bailee) (emphasis
added).
49. Judge Conrad Cyr is very well-respected in the field of bankruptcy law. At pres-
ent he is a contributing editor to Collier on Bankruptcy, and from 1970 to 1981 he was
Editor-in-Chief of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal. See W. Dornett & R. Cross,
Federal Judiciary Almanac 497 (1984).
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newly revised Article 8 of the U.C.C. also appears to be in accord with
the Kontaratos result.5 0 Hence, this trend toward requiring notice to
come exclusively from the pledgor is an important new development that
must be fully addressed.
A. The Kontaratos Rationales
1. Modification of the Bailment
The first reason set forth for requiring notice from the debtor is based
on a technical application of the law of bailments. A pledge of personal
property is defined as a bailment for the purpose of securing payment or
performance of an obligation." Thus, a secured party who takes posses-
sion of collateral for the purpose of perfecting his own interest is a
bailee.5 2 Moreover, pledgees in possession, as bailees, also can hold col-
lateral for the purpose of perfecting secondary security interests within
the meaning of section 9-305. 53 Because Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not
50. In 1977, sections of Article 8 of the U.C.C. were revised and one of the changes
concerns what constitutes delivery of certificated securities for purposes of perfecting se-
curity interests therein. U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(h)(ii) (1978) provides that transfer of a secur-
ity interest in certificated securities occurs when "a written notification, which . . . is
signed by the debtor (which may be a copy of the security agreement)... is received by a
third person ... in possession of the security . .. ."
Section 8-313 does not state specifically that the debtor must be the one who actually
sends the signed, written notification. Several commentators, however, have interpreted
the section to mean precisely that. See, e.g., Aronstein, U. C. C. Survey: Investment Secur-
ities, 38 Bus. Law. 1179, 1183 (1983) [hereinafter UCC Survey] ("Under new sections 8-
313(1)(h) and 8-321(2), a security interest is perfected by the owner giving written notice
to the bank."); C. Israels & E. Guttman, Modern Securities Transfers § 4.02, at S.4-49
(Supp. 1985) (relying on Kontaratos to conclude that notice from debtor required); see
also UCC Survey, supra at 1184-85. But see Investment Securities, supra note 43, at 1027-
28 (only additional requirement is existence of security agreement signed by debtor and
receipt of notice of the security interest by bailee). Nevertheless, the Code is ambiguous
on the point, and there is no clear analytical reason for requiring the debtor to actually
send the written notice himself. The purpose behind requiring written notification signed
by the debtor is equally well served by a junior creditor's delivery of a copy of the original
security agreement between himself and the debtor to the third person. See infra notes
130-31 and accompanying text.
51. Restatement of Security § 1 (1941); see Brown on Personal Property § 128 (3rd
ed. 1975); J. Lawson, Law on Bailments § 50, at 92 (1895) ("pledge or pawn is the bail-
ment of a chattel as security for some debt or engagement") (footnote omitted).
52. If a pledge is a bailment at law, then the pledgor and pledgee respectively stand in
the relationship of bailor and bailee. According to the Restatement of Security, for exam-
ple, "[t]he pledgee in possession is a bailee and the rule stated in [section 17] is the rule as
to a bailee's liability for lack of reasonable care." Restatement of Security § 17 comment
b (1941) (citations omitted) (discussing pledgee's duty of reasonable care).
53. In the Kontaratos decision, Judge Cyr initially argues that the double-pledge situ-
ation is unique, stating: "Highly respected authority states that a pledgee in possession
may be a bailee for UCC § 9-305 purposes, though no reported decision has ever done
so." In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 964-65 (D. Me. 1981) (footnote omitted). Judge
Cyr was not exactly correct, however, regarding the uniqueness of the pledgee-bailee situ-
ation, and subsequent case law has confirmed that pledgees in possession may act as § 9-
305 bailees.
At the time of the Kontaratos decision, there was significant authority for the proposi-
NOTICE IN THE DOUBLE-PLEDGE
define "bailee," however, courts must look to the common law for con-
trolling principles of law.54
Under common law principles, a bailment is the delivery of personal
property to a person in trust for a specific purpose, coupled with a con-
tract, express or implied, that the trust shall be executed faithfully, and
the property returned when the special purpose is accomplished." A
pledge is the delivery of collateral for purposes of securing payment or
performance by a pledgor s6
As in any bailment, however, the special purpose for which a pledgee-
bailee is entrusted by a pledgor with possession of collateral depends on
the terms of their security agreement.5 7 The relationship between any
tion that a first pledgee of collateral could be a bailee for purposes of perfecting a junior
interest. See In re Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 649, 652 (W.D. Mich. 1968) ("[Unless
we hold that one secured party can hold for all we would be severely and unnecessarily
restricting opportunities to finance by security agreements .... ). In an article on newly
revised Article 8 of the U.C.C., the authors discussed conclusions reached by the Perma-
nent Editorial Board for the UCC (PEB) as to the applicability of the perfection by notice
provision of § 9-305 in the double-pledge situation, when the Board contemplated revi-
sions in Article 8, stating: "In light of the common understanding that a pledge is a
bailment to secure an obligation, it was undisputed that a senior pledgee in possession of
the security was the 'bailee' to be notified, and that section 9-305 controlled." Aronstein,
Haydock, & Scott, Article 8 is Ready, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 902-03 (1980) [hereinafter
Article 8] (footnote omitted). In his discussion of perfecting a security interest through
notice, Professor Gilmore discussed possible situations where a creditor would not be
able to take actual possession, and notice would be the only alternative method of perfec-
tion, and stated: "the collateral may be in the possession of a third person who holds
merely as a bailee or who may himself claim a pledge or other interest." I G. Gilmore,
supra note 16, § 14.2, at 440 (emphasis added). See also B. Clark, supra note 45, F 7.7[2],
at 7-17 (1980) (posing hypothetical in which pledgee-bailee holds for a junior pledgee).
Finally, although it was true that no "reported decision" had actually ever discussed
§ 9-305 in the context of a double-pledge situation at the time Judge Cyr wrote
Kontaratos; it is clear from subsequent case law that a pledgee-bailee can act as a § 9-305
bailee for purposes of perfecting a junior security interest. See Furness Withy (Charter-
ing), Inc. v. World Energy Sys. Assocs., 642 F. Supp. 50, 55 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) ("The
fact that [the bailee] had an interest in the proceeds of the letter of credit does not dis-
qualify it from acting as an agent on behalf of the other [creditors]."); Landmark Land
Co. v. Sprague, 529 F. Supp 971, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (pledgee of collateral may possess
pledged collateral on behalf of junior pledgee), rev'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1065 (2d
Cir. 1983); In re Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd., 24 Bankr. 57, 58-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)
(bank asserting security interest in the account in its possession may also possess the
account on behalf of another bank claiming security interest therein).
54. See In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 50 Bankr. 830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); In re
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 967 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); McDaniel v. American Druggists
Ins. Co. (In re National Buy-Rite, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 196, 197 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see Inger-
soll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 671 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1982); Heinicke Instruments
Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1976); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978)
(common law principles shall supplement Code provisions unless they are specifically
displaced); cf U.C.C. § 1-201 (1978) (no definition of bailment).
55. See J. Lawson, supra note 51, § 5, at 9; J. Story, Bailments § 2 (1870); see, e.g.,
Maulding v. United States, 257 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1953); Lash v. Knapp, 143 N.Y.S.2d
516, 518-19 (Sup. CL 1955); Kantola v. Lovell Auto Co., 157 Or. 534, 538, 72 P.2d 61,
62-63 (1937).
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 968 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (emphasis in origi-
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bailor and bailee is a contractual one.5" Thus, some courts conclude that
because holding property for the purpose of perfecting a secondary secur-
ity interest was not one of the special objects or purposes of the original
pledge-bailment, a senior pledgee could not act as a section 9-305 bailee,
absent modification of the original agreement. 9
This technical analysis of the section 9-305 bailment was laid out in
detail by the court in Kontaratos. Courts that subsequently have ad-
dressed the issue have cited Kontaratos for the proposition that mere no-
tification by the junior pledgee is insufficient to create a bailment that
conforms with section 9-305, 0 but their reasons for so holding are not as
clearly stated.
In Kontaratos, the pledgors purchased all of the stock of a corporation
using money borrowed from the plaintiff, Hale, and the Depositors Trust
Company of Southern Maine (DTC).6 To secure the loans from both
Hale and DTC, the pledgors granted each party a security interest in the
stock.62 DTC, however, did not know of Hale's interest when DTC took
physical possession of the stock.63 Although DTC's loan was closed sub-
sequent to the closing of the Hale loan, the pledgors warranted to DTC
that they were the sole owners of the stock and that no encumbrances
would be created without DTC's prior approval. 64
The pledgors subsequently defaulted on both loans, and two months
later Hale notified DTC of the stock pledge and related agreements be-
tween Hale and the pledgors, and demanded the right to redeem the
stock.65 DTC refused.66 The pledgors filed for bankruptcy and Hale in-
stituted adversary proceedings seeking relief from an automatic stay.67
The issue before the court was whether Hale had a perfected security
nal). See Restatement of Security §§ 14, 37 (1941) (dealing with underlying contractual
nature of pledge).
58. See J. Lawson, supra note 51, § 5, at 9 ("certain contract relation exists between
the parties, and this relation is called a bailment"); id. § 9, at 23 ("bailment being a
contract relation, the parties thereto must be capable of contracting"); see also id. §§ 10,
11, 13, 18, 21.
59. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 968 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). See In re Coral
Petroleum, Inc., 50 Bankr. 830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (junior creditor failed to
establish existence of a bailment consistent with U.C.C. § 9-305).
60. See Landmark Land Co. v. Sprague, 529 F. Supp. 971, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(court cites Kontaratos in holding that instructions from pledgor to senior creditor regard-
ing the junior security interest deemed essential to perfect junior interest), rev'd on other
grounds, 701 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Baquet, 61 Bankr. 495, 501 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1986) (simply citing Kontaratos); In re Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr. 830, 839
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (same).
61. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 958 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The part of the pledge agreement which prohibits the creation of competing
pledges hereinafter is referred to as a negative pledge clause.
65. Id. at 959.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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interest in the stock.6" Hale argued that upon giving notice to DTC, his
security interest became perfected under section 9-305.69 The court
disagreed.7°
Writing the Kontaratos opinion, Judge Cyr held that following per-
formance by, and without the approval of, the pledgor, a pledgee in pos-
session could not be compelled to hold or surrender possession of the
collateral in contravention of the terms of their pledge agreement upon
notification by a mere junior pledgee.7" After briefly reviewing the law of
bailments, Judge Cyr stated that since "the special object or purpose for
which a bailee is entrusted by a pledgor with possession of collateral de-
pends upon the terms of their pledge agreement,"72 a "pledgee in posses-
sion cannot be cast in the role of U.C.C. § 9-305 bailee absent a
conforming adjustment of [that] agreement."73
Judge Cyr basically conceded that the purpose behind requiring ad-
justment of the agreement by the pledgor is not to provide the pledgee-
bailee with the opportunity to accept changes in the original contract.74
Under the Code, a pledgee-bailee need not acknowledge formally that he
holds on a junior pledgee's behalf. 5 More important, however, he has no
right even to refuse the section 9-305 bailment. Allowing the senior
pledgee to refuse to hold collateral as a section 9-305 bailee effectively
would be to allow him to veto the creation of a junior pledge.76 Judge
Cyr nevertheless held that modification of the terms of the original bail-
ment was still necessary because the contract had to reflect that the se-
nior pledgee in possession was now also holding the collateral for a junior
pledgee.77 In other words, Judge Cyr construed the term "bailee" in sec-
tion 9-305 literally to mean a party whose bailment contract explicitly
describes them as "a § 9-305 bailee."78 Thus Judge Cyr concluded, and
68. Id at 959, 963.
69. Id at 963.
70. Id
71. Id at 966. See DeKoven, U.C.C Survey: Secured Transactions, 38 Bus. Law.
1195, 1213 (1983).
72. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 968 (emphasis in original).
73. Id at 967 n.59(2).
74. See infra notes 75-76.
75. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 967 n.59(2) (citing U.C.C. § 9-305 official comment 2
(1978) which states: "IThis rule rejects the common law doctrine that it is necessary for
the bailee to attorn to the secured party or acknowledge that he now holds on his
behalf.").
76. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 966. Judge Cyr stated that the drafters of the Restate-
ment were well within their rights to deny a bailee veto power. Id. See infra note 94.
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Judge Cyr believed modification was
especially necessary when there was a negative pledge clause in the original pledge agree-
ment. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 968 ("Where the agreement between the pledgor and the
pledgee-bailee expressly prohibits the creation of other encumbrances there is no evidence
of a conformable UCC § 9-305 bailment and it would be unreasonable to imply one.")
(emphasis added).
78. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 968 ("secured party depending for the perfection of its
security interest upon the possession of a UCC § 9-305 bailee must establish the existence
of a bailment consistent therewith").
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other courts agree,79 that notification of the bailee under section 9-305
79. In another case, Landmark Land Co. v. Sprague, 529 F. Supp. 971, 980
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1983), the court similarly
framed the issue as whether the senior creditor possessed the collateral in question as "the
agent or bailee of [the junior creditor] within the meaning of § 9305 [sic]." Citing
Kontaratos, the court held that instructions from the pledgor to the senior pledgee to
deliver the collateral to the junior pledgee upon satisfaction of the debt by the pledgor
created a section 9-305 bailment. See id. Similarly in In re Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr.
830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985), the court held that the junior pledgee failed to establish
a section 9-305 bailment relationship upon mere notification of the senior pledgee.
In Coral Petroleum, the court also made a second argument for rejecting the junior
creditor's claims. The court stated that senior secured creditors can never be § 9-305
bailees because they have an "interest in the instrument in [their] possession," and conse-
quently there is a danger of the bailee "trying to pass the instrument off as his own." Id.
The court cites only one case for the proposition that bailees must be disinterested, In re
National Buy-Rite, Inc., I1 Bankr. 196, 198 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), and then sidesteps
more persuasive and relevant authority to the contrary, by distinguishing a case on the
basis of irrelevant facts. See Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr. at 839-40 (citing In re Chapman,
5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (W.D. Mich. 1968)). The Chapman case, however,
plainly stands for the proposition that one secured party can hold for another. In re
Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (W.D. Mich. 1968). But the most telling
evidence of how illogical the Coral Petroleum court's conclusion is comes from the court
itself, when it indicates that the junior creditor could have claimed a perfected security
interest, had all the parties executed a formal agency agreement establishing a § 9-305
bailment. See Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr. at 840. Such an agreement clearly would not
have changed the bailee's status as an "interested stakeholder." Id. See also B. Clark,
supra note 45, 7.7[2], at S7-7 (1986 Supp. No. 3). Although Professor Clark acknowl-
edges that Coral Petroleum "underscores the importance of obtaining a three-way agency
agreement in the double pledge situation," he concludes that "a good argument may be
made that the decision is wrong." Id. Professor Clark goes on to state that U.C.C. § 9-
305 does not require a three-way agreement, "and no line is drawn between 'disinterested'
bailees and those who are competing secured parties." Id. See also infra note 94 (collect-
ing cases which approve the double-pledge situation).
A third, unreported decision, Winnett v. Inverness Counsel, Inc., No. 76 Civ. 3810
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1979) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), aff'd without
opinion, 614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), seems to have foreshadowed Kontaratos. In Win-
nett, the court held that a junior security interest was not perfected when the senior
pledgee in possession refused to turn over or hold collateral for a junior pledgee absent
instructions from the pledgor. Id. The court made it clear, however, that had the pledgor
notified the senior pledgee, the junior pledgee would have had a perfected security
interest:
Under P5 of [their] Agreement, [the pledgor] could have been compelled to
assist [the junior pledgee] in perfecting his security interest in the ... stock.
[The junior] chose not to seek [the pledgor's] assistance, and the steps that [the
junior] took on his own behalf to perfect his interest were ineffective.
Id. Hence, notice from the junior pledgee was insufficient to effect any modification of
the original agreement between the pledgor and the bank holding the stock which was
necessary to give rise to a § 9-305 bailment.
Winnett is the case most cited for the proposition that junior creditors cannot perfect
through notification because a pledgee in possession cannot be conscripted into service as
an involuntary § 9-305 bailee. See, e.g., In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 965 n.47
(Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Coral Petroleum, 50 Bankr. at 840; see also 1B Secured Transac-
tions, supra note 21, § 14.02[2], at 23 (Supp. 1986) (noting involuntary bailment argu-
ment in Winnett). Nonetheless, as the court in Winnett makes clear, notice from the
pledgor would have served to perfect the junior pledgee's interest. Thus, a first pledgee of
stock or goods can be compelled effectively to serve as a 9-305 bailee against its will by
any debtor, hence the fatal flaw in the argument.
[Vol. 55
NOTICE IN THE DOUBLE-PLEDGE
could only mean notification by the pledgor, as contracting party to the
original agreement.
Though persuasive, Judge Cyr's bailment modification argument fails
on three grounds. First, the argument that notice has to come from the
pledgor in order to modify the original bailment contract is unsupported
by established pre-Code and U.C.C. precedent. Prior to Kontaratos,
cases discussing notice to both pure bailees and pledgee-bailees consist-
ently stated that notice could come from either the pledgor or the se-
cured party. °
Even though the court in Kontaratos limited its holding to double-
pledge situations, there is no difference between a pure bailee and a
pledgee-bailee regarding the contractual nature of their relationship to
the pledgor, however different the terms of their individual agreements
with the pledgor may be." An ordinary bailee who has no security inter-
est in the property in his possession has an established contractual rela-
tionship with the pledgor and is as guided by the terms of his contract as
is a pledgee-bailee.82 Nevertheless, it is well established that notice can
come from either the pledgor or the pledgee in a pure bailee situation.83
Courts have never referred to a need for modifying the original bailment
contracts.84 In the double-pledge situation, courts consistently have held
80. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Compare Restatement of Security
§ 1 (1941) (pledge defined) and id. § 14 (modification of normal incidents of pledge) and
id. § 17 (pledgee's duty of reasonable care) and iL § 37 (duty to return asset upon per-
formance by pledgor) with J. Lawson, Law of Bailments § 5 (1895) (bailment defined)
and id. § 13 (modification of agreement) and id § 11 (care and diligence required of
bailees) and id § 22(d) (duty to re-deliver bailed goods).
82. See supra notes 55-58 & 81 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 44; see also Rogers v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 82, 86 (D. Minn.
1980) (secured party notified bailee and thereby perfected his interest under Minn. Stat.
§ 336.9-305); Johnson v. Conrail-Amtrak Fed. Credit Union, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 933, 940 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1983) (bailee had notice of secured party's rights in
collateral, and secured party herself was the one who gave that notice). Even Judge Cyr
in Kontaratos seems to concede the point that notice can come from either the pledgor or
the pledgee in a pure bailment situation. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 966 n.52 (D.
Me. 1981). He then goes on to state, however, that in the double-pledge situation, "the
identity of the 'notice' giver may be pivotal." Id. Judge Cyr argues that in the pure bailee
situation, the person in possession is not under the control of the debtor. In the double-
pledge situation, however, control over the crucial part of the collateral "rests entirely
with the debtor," according to Judge Cyr. See id at 969. Nevertheless, it is clear that
once Judge Cyr's control argument is negated, there is no longer any basis for distinguish-
ing between pure bailees and pledgee-bailees. Although he makes two other arguments
for requiring notice from the debtor, neither is persuasive. See infra note 94 (discussion
of involuntary conscription argument and negative pledge clause argument).
84. See In re Estate of Hinds, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 1024, 89 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343 &
n.6 (1970) (court found notice alone rendered bailee an agent of secured party and iden-
tity of notice-giver was irrelevant). The Hinds court apparently did not consider the
identity of the notice-giver under section 9-305 relevant. In fact, the only issue before the
court was whether the secured party himself had to notify the bailee of the stock, not
whether the secured party could send the notice. Id The court focused on the impor-
tance of the receipt of notice, stating: "Since there is no requirement that the secured
party personally give notice, only that the bailee receive it, appellant's security interest
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that secured creditors acquire possession upon the notification of a
pledgee-bailee, without reference to adjustments in the contractual rela-
tionships between the parties.85
Second, contract modification typically requires the consent of both
parties to the original agreement because the purpose of modification is
to ensure that both parties agree to and accept changes in the contract.8 6
Modification essentially recreates the earlier offer and acceptance stage of
the contract. It is clear, however, that under the U.C.C. the third party
bailee's acceptance or refusal of notice is irrelevant to the perfection of a
security interest.8 7 The bailee has no right to refuse or accept the imposi-
tion of the agency relationship between himself and the secured party
created upon notice to the bailee of that party's security interest.8 8
was perfected .... " Id. at 343. See also In re Miller, 545 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.)
(although debtor sent notice in this case, entire focus of court's opinion was on whether
the documents evidenced an intent on the part of the parties to create a security interest,
and whether the letter sent to the bailee "adequately served to notify the [bailee] of [the
creditor's] rights in the collateral" so as to perfect latter's interest), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
987 (1977); Barney v. Rigby Loan & Inv. Co., 344 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Idaho 1972)
("bailee-trustee ... received notification of the secured party's interest well before the
four-month period and the [secured party's] possession became effective simultaneously
therewith").
85. For example, in Schram v. Sage, 46 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Mich. 1942), the court
cited the Restatement of Security § 8 and held that where stock certificates were in the
possession of a bank, as senior pledgee, a subsequent pledge agreement between the
pledgor and a junior pledgee, of which the bank had notice, created a pledge junior to the
bank's pledge. Id. at 383. In Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 978
(2d Cir. 1945), the court similarly held that "the owner of personal property subject to a
prior pledge, perfected by delivery of possession, may make a valid pledge of his remain-
ing interest to a second pledgee, by simple execution of a contract to that effect. The only
additional requirement suggested is that the first pledgee be given notice of such con-
tract." (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Finally, in Pierce v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 268 F. 487, 495 (8th Cir. 1920), the court held that a pledgor may lawfully
repledge his interest in collateral "by a contract or conveyance to that effect and notice
thereof to the first pledgee, who will then be deemed to hold the property in trust for both
pledgees as their interests exist." (emphasis added). Note that in Pierce, the court does
not speak of a separate modification of the original pledge agreement, but instead merely
states that a senior pledgee will be "deemed" to have possession for both pledgees upon
receiving notice. Id.
86. See U.C.C. § 2-209 official comment 3 (1978) (modification reflects changes mu-
tually consented to by parties); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 5-14, at 192 (2d ed.
1977) (under pre-existing duty rule, agreement to modify requires consideration on both
sides), id. § 5-15, at 195 (reason for requiring consideration under pre-existing duty rule
is to prevent "coerced modification of contracts"); id. § 4-1, at 134-35 (essence of consid-
eration is legal detriment "that has been bargained for and exchanged for" promise to
perform).
87. According to U.C.C. § 9-305 official comment 2 (1978), a secured party is deemed
to have possession from the time that the bailee receives notification of the security inter-
est, and there is no need "for the bailee to attorn to the secured party or acknowledge that
he now holds on his behalf." According to Professor Gilmore, the "bailee with notice"
provision was inspired by cases which followed the Restatement of Security § 8 (1941),
and mere notice was sufficient to perfect an interest. I G. Gilmore, supra note 16, § 14.2,
at 440. See 1A Secured Transactions, supra note 21, § 6C.08[l], at 6C-126 to -127.
88. See supra note 40. Professor Coogan, commenting on the Restatement's position
that the notified bailee has no right to refuse or accept the agency relationship created
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Hence, Judge Cyr's use of the bailment "contract" as a basis for requir-
ing modification seems rather fragile in the context of perfecting a junior
pledgee's interest. The pledgee-bailee is informed of the change regard-
less of which party notifies him. The purpose behind contract modifica-
tion is not served by requiring one-way notice from the pledgor s9
Third, assuming that Judge Cyr is correct in requiring that the bail-
ment-pledge agreement reflect that the pledgee-bailee holds for a junior
pledgee, modification of the contract still may not be necessary. The se-
curity agreement between the pledgor and senior pledgee includes far
more than a promise to pay coupled with the grant of an interest in col-
lateral." Indeed, it is probable that the parties contemplated the grant-
upon notification, stated that apparently "[t]he drafters of the Restatement did not find
the imposition of these duties on a bailee... to be onerous at all." IA Secured Transac-
tions, supra note 21, § 6C.08[I][b], at 6C-127. After citing Comment a to section 8, Coo-
gan observed: "Here we have a development which parallels the recognition that
contract rights are freely assignable, and the contract obligor cannot generally object to
having to perform for a stranger." IdL Moreover, concluded Professor Coogan, it was
not "necessary to apologize" for section 9-305's obligating a bailee to perform for an-
other, because "[k]eeping tract of who is to get the collateral is no more abnormal than
keeping tract of who is to be paid for services rendered or goods delivered." Id. Cf
U.C.C. § 9-318(2) official comment 2 (1978):
Prior law was in confusion as to whether modification of an executory contract
by account debtor and assignor without the assignee's consent was possible after
notification of an assignment. Subsection (2) makes good faith modifications by
assignor and account debtor without the assignee's consent effective against the
assignee even after notification. This rule may do some violence to accepted
doctrines of contract law. Nevertheless it is a sound and indeed a necessary rule
in view of the realities of large scale procurement.
89. Some courts have also hinted at a fairness argument in holding that notice from a
junior creditor was insufficient to perfect his interest; i.e., how can a third person in
possession of collateral be obligated to perform for a junior creditor against his will? See
In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 50 Bankr. 830, 840 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing the
senior creditor in possession's unwillingness to hold for the junior); In re Kontaratos, 10
Bankr. 956, 966-67 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (discussing the "onerousness" of an involuntary
bailment); see also Winnett v. Inverness Counsel, Inc., No. 76 Civ. 3810 (S.D.N.Y. Au-
gust 14, 1979) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (pledgee-bailee cannot be
forced to hold collateral for junior pledgee against its will), aff'd without opinion, 614
F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979). The issue has been discussed in the context of the possible
duties and liabilities of a notified bailee. See Article 8, supra note 53, at 905-07. Notice
from the pledgor, however, is equally as onerous as notice from the pledgee, given that
the bailee still has no right of acceptance or refusal.
90. Under U.C.C. § 9-203, a valid security agreement is one that is signed by the
debtor and contains a description of the collateral. Once the debtor signs such a writing,
and assuming that he has acquired rights in the collateral and value has been given, the
security agreement becomes enforceable and is said to have "attached." See U.C.C. § 9-
203 (1978). It is clear, however, that other provisions of Article 9 give rise to more rights
and obligations than those stated in the actual security agreement. See. e.g.. U.C.C. § 9-
207 (1978) (setting forth the rights and duties of a secured party in possession of collat-
eral); id. § 9-208 (upon debtor's request, secured party must provide statement of account
or list of collateral); id. § 9-311 (alienability of debtor's rights in collateral); id. § 9-
318(2)-(3) (modification of contract after receiving notice of assignment, and ineffective-
ness of any contract term prohibiting assignment); id § 9-405 (allowing secured party to
assign security interest); id § 9-503 (giving a secured party the right to take possession of
collateral after default); ia § 9-504 (giving a secured party the right to dispose of collat-
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ing of secondary security interests at the time they entered into the
original agreement.
For example, section 9-207 provides that the pledgee-bailee himself
"may repledge the collateral upon terms which do not impair the
[pledgor's] right to redeem it," without informing the pledgor. 91 More-
over, section 9-311 makes clear that the debtor always retains the right to
transfer an interest in collateral despite the existence of a negative pledge
clause in the original security agreement.92 Hence, a modification of the
original agreement is not necessary because the security agreement im-
pliedly provides for secondary security interests and for the repledge of
collateral by the pledgee-bailee.
2. Relinquishment of Control
The second rationale in Kontaratos for holding that notification of the
bailee means notification by the pledgor focused on the issues of control
and public notice. 93
Judge Cyr began his analysis by stating that the situation in which a
third party bailee is also a pledgee is different from an ordinary bail-
ment.94 Essentially, the analysis turned on the concept that control of
eral after default by a debtor); id. § 9-506 (giving the debtor the right to redeem
collateral).
91. U.C.C. § 9-207(e) (1978). Drafters of the Code expressly intended the rule stated
in § 9-207 to follow established common law precedents. See id. official comment 2; see
generally Restatement of Security §§ 23 Comment b, 29 (1941) (discussing general rules
with respect to the repledge of collateral).
92. See U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978):
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred
(by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement
prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.
93. A security interest in personal property may be perfected by the secured party's
taking possession of the collateral, and such possession may be either by the secured party
himself or by an agent acting on his behalf. See U.C.C. § 9-305 & official comment 2
(1978). For purposes of perfecting a security interest, pre-Code law defined possession as
meaning control. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. When goods are in the
possession of a third person, that person, upon receiving notice of the new interest, is
deemed an "agent" of the secured party for purposes of perfecting the secured party's
interest. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Possession by the secured party or an
agent acting on his behalf satisfies the public notice requirement underlying § 9-305 and
the common law of pledges, because it removes ostensible ownership from the debtor.
See supra notes 30-31, 38-39 and accompanying text. For the same reason, however, the
debtor or any person controlled by him cannot qualify as such an agent for the secured
party. See U.C.C. § 9-305 official comment 2 (1978); 1B Secured Transactions, supra
note 21, § 14.02[2], at 23 (Supp. 1986).
94. Judge Cyr asserted that earlier decisions which stated that either party could give
the notice could not have been reached with the double-pledge situation in mind. In re
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 966 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). It is clear, however, that earlier
cases and distinguished commentators did consider the double-pledge situation. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
Judge Cyr focused on Professor Gilmore's treatise in particular, and posited that Gil-
more must have been "prompted" by the Restatement of Security § 8 in stating that
notice could come from either party. See Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 966 n.5 2. Judge Cyr
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property in a pledgee-bailee situation is bifurcated. According to Judge
then went on to observe that the Restatement itself "did not contemplate a secondary
pledge of investment securities," as if to discredit Gilmore's conclusions. Id.
Judge Cyr based his conclusions with respect to the Restatement of Security on the
observation in comment a to section 8 that a third party bailee may surrender the posses-
sion if he does not wish to be under any duty to the pledgee. If the third party was
actually a pledgee-bailee, however, he could not surrender possession without losing his
perfected security interest. See id. at 966. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978) (perfection contin-
ues only so long as secured party retains possession). Hence, Judge Cyr concluded that
the Restatement was not intended to cover the double-pledge situation, see Kontaratos 10
Bankr. at 966 & n.52, although he does not deal with the cases and commentators that
have expressly stated that notice from either party is sufficient to perfect an interest. Id.
at 966 n.52.
According to Judge Cyr, notice from the junior pledgee in a double-pledge situation is
a problem because it effectively conscripts the pledgee-bailee into serving as the junior
pledgee's agent against the bailee's will. See id at 966-67. The pledgee-bailee does not
have the same freedom of choice that the ordinary bailee has by virtue of the fact that he
does not have a security interest in the goods in his possession. Compare Restatement of
Security § 8 comment a, at 23-24 (1941) (pure bailee has option of relinquishing control if
he does not want to hold for the pledgee) with U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978) (if pledgee-bailee
gives up possession he loses his perfected security interest). Judge Cyr, however, did not
go so far as to require that the pledgee-bailee have the option of either accepting or re-
jecting the agency relationship. See Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 966 ("The drafters of the
Restatement were well within their rights in refusing to permit a third person in posses-
sion of collateral to veto the creation of a secondary pledge.") (emphasis in original).
Instead, he used the involuntary conscription argument to hold that a better form of
notice is required, than "mere notification by a secured party." See id. Presumably the
pledgee-bailee will rest easier if the debtor notifies him, in that he thereby is assured of the
validity of the second pledge. This reasoning is implicit in Judge Cyr's comments. See id.
at 966-67 ("What is more, if a pledgee may be conscripted into service as a UCC § 9-305
bailee on mere notification by another pledgee, he may be drawn at great risk and expense
into litigation to defend, against the pledgor and any number of pledgees, his own pledge
as well as any surrender of possession to the pledgor or to another pledgee.").
In acknowledging that the pledgee-bailee does not have to attorn to the secured party
and the pledgee-bailee does not have the right to veto the creation of secondary security
interests, however, Judge Cyr exposed the fundamental flaw in his involuntary conscrip-
tion argument. Unless the pledgee-bailee is given the option of vetoing the creation of a
second pledge, in effect, there is no real distinction between the pledgee-bailee and the
pure bailee. Even if notice comes from the debtor in the double-pledge situation, the
bailment is equally as onerous because it is equally as involuntary. The sole distinction
Judge Cyr seems to be advocating, then, is that in one situation the bearer of the bad news
should be the pledgor and in another it should be, or rather, can be the pledgee. See
supra note 79 (discussion of Winnett case wherein court applied involuntary conscription
argument, but then observed that notice from the pledgor would have been sufficient to
obligate the pledgee-bailee to hold for the junior creditor).
It is at this point that Judge Cyr exposed one of the key reasons for his decision not to
allow the junior pledgee to perfect through notice to an unwilling senior pledgee-his
hesitancy to enforce the second pledge in the face of a negative pledge clause in the origi-
nal agreement between the pledgor and the senior pledgee. Judge Cyr stated: "[Tlhe
commercial mischief flowing from a policy which would impose upon a pledgee in posses-
sion the obligation to perform for the holder of a secondary pledge expressly prohibited
under the first pledge agreement would greatly inhibit the utility of the primary pledge as
a security device." Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 967 n.58. Then Judge Cyr concluded that
"no UCC § 9-305 bailment [can exist] where the agreement between the pledgor and the
pledgee in possession prohibits other encumbrances." Id. at 967 n.59.
Judge Cyr fails to consider, however, the countervailing Code policy of protecting the
alienability of the debtor's rights in collateral, notwithstanding the existence of negative
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Cyr, control of the property rested with the pledgee in possession only
with respect to his own perfected security interest, while the "timing and
direction of the post-performance disposition of the collateral remain[ed]
within the control of the [pledgor] throughout.""5 Judge Cyr then rea-
soned that because the junior interest could only attach to that part of
the collateral in which the senior pledgee did not have an interest-spe-
cifically the theoretical "remainder" left over after the senior pledgee has
been satisfied-the junior pledgee could not perfect his own interest
through mere notice because the pledgor still technically controlled this
"remainder" interest.96
pledge clauses. See U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978); see also DeKoven, U.C.C. Survey: Secured
Transactions, 38 Bus. Law. 1195, 1214 (1983) ("Resting the decision on the provision of
the pledge agreement prohibiting further encumbrances does not give due regard to the
U.C.C. policy favoring alienability of the debtor's rights in collateral as set forth in sec-
tion 9-31 .").
Finally, acknowledging that the junior pledgee has a perfected security interest despite
the existence of a negative pledge clause in no way hurts the senior pledgee in possession.
The senior pledgee, who already has a perfected security interest, can always maintain an
action for breach of contract against the pledgor for creating the second pledge and accel-
erate payments on the loan obligation. See, e.g., Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M.
221, 223-24, 656 P.2d 884, 886-87 (1983) (U.C.C. § 9-311 does not invalidate contract
provision making a transfer of collateral a default, but simply allows two parties to define
conditions of default while preserving interest of transferee); Sturdevant v. First Sec.
Bank, 186 Mont. 91, 96-97, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980) (same); J. White and R. Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 26-7, at 1104 (2d ed.
1980). The actual security interest of the junior pledgee, however, remains valid and
enforceable pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-311. See Brummund, 99 N.M. at 223, 656 P.2d at
886 (Section 9-311 preserves interest of transferee); Marine Midland Bank-Eastern Nat'l
Ass'n v. Conerty Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 311, 318, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953, 961-62
(1974) (debtor can create junior liens notwithstanding negative pledge clause, and junior
interest is merely subordinated to senior interest).
The interests of both pledgees, then, are protected under the Code. Since the senior
pledgee always retains the right to dispose of the collateral and apply the proceeds to the
debt in the event of the pledgor's default, he can always recoup his investment if the
pledgor cannot pay upon acceleration of the debt. See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504 (1978)
(self-help repossession and right to dispose provisions). At that point in time, any surplus
could be turned over either to the junior pledgee to satisfy the junior lien, or to the courts
for proper disposition if the senior pledgee was unsure about the validity of the junior
interest. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 67 (a party may deposit personal property with court
for determination of various claimants' rights to the property, regardless of whether he
has an interest in the property.).
95. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 969 n.77 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (emphasis
added).
96. As Judge Cyr framed his point:
Hale [the junior creditor] points out appropriately enough that DTC [the
pledgee in possession] is not under the control of the debtors as concerns the
retention of these securities as collateral for the DTC loan, since DTC may
reasonably be expected to safeguard its own interests by retaining the collateral
until its debt is satisfied. The appropriate test is not the adequacy of DTC's
possession as a means of perfecting its own security interest, however, but that
of Hale. The timing and direction of the post-performance disposition of the col-
lateral remains within the control of the debtors throughout. Therefore, the 'eq-
uity cushion' to which the Hale security interest attaches remains under the
control of the debtors in these circumstances.
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Judge Cyr based his conclusions on two points of law. First, two se-
cured parties cannot have control over the same part of collateral when
that collateral secures both of their respective security interests. 97 A se-
nior pledgee cannot relinquish control over the part of the collateral that
secures his interest because he would lose his perfected interest in doing
so. Therefore, a junior pledgee's interest can attach only to the remain-
ing "equity cushion," namely, the value of the collateral over and above
the senior's interest.9" Second, the pledgor always controls this equity
cushion, irrespective of the pledgee-bailee's possession of the collateral,
until the time when the pledgor actually releases control. The pledgor's
control over the equity cushion, prior to such a release, is clear. First, he
always retains the right to encumber an asset further, even after granting
a first security interest in it, when the value of the asset will support a
second pledge.99 Second, the pledgee in possession is legally obligated to
return the collateral to the pledgor upon performance or satisfaction of
the debt obligation owed to the senior pledgee."
Essentially then, Judge Cyr argued in Kontaratos that, absent notifica-
tion by the pledgor, the collateral in the bailee's possession to which the
junior interest might have attached was still under the pledgor's "con-
trol" by virtue of the terms of the original agreement between the pledgor
and the bailee.101 Because the pledgor had not notified the pledgee in
Idr (emphasis added).
97. See infra note 98.
98. According to U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978), "[a] security interest is perfected by posses-
sion from the time possession is taken ... and continues only so long as possession is
retained." Since possession is defined as "control," see supra note 29 and accompanying
text, then any loss of "control" by a pledgee-bailee results in the loss of possession. The
premise of Judge Cyr's argument is that two individuals cannot be simultaneously in
"control" of the same equity interest in collateral. See supra note 96. Thus, although
both are deemed to be in "possession," the two secured parties are actually in possession
of different "pieces" of the collateral. In effect, then, the junior pledgee's constructive
"possession" is limited to that part of the collateral that the pledgee-bailee does not need
to "control" for purposes of perfecting his own interest.
99. See U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978) (debtor's rights in the alienability of collateral
protected).
100. See Jenkins v. National Village Bank, 58 Me. 275, 277-78 (1870) (bailee obligated
to return pledged securites upon performance); Restatement of Security § 22 comment b
(1941) (pledgee liable for conversion for refusing to surrender a chattel on demand)
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 223); see also Restatement of Torts § 223(g) (1934) (a
conversion is committed by refusing to surrender a chattel on demand). Essentially then,
[t]he pledge as a security device ceases to exist when the reason for its creation
is executed.... Indeed, once the obligation is discharged, the pledgee has a duty
to return possession of the property to his pledgor .... The pledgee who fails to
return the collateral upon satisfaction of the original obligation conducts him-
self in such a manner as to create an action in conversion for such conduct.
Squillante, The Pledge as a Security Device, Part IV, 88 Commercial L. J. 159, 163 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
101. According to Judge Cyr, the debtor's control of the equity cushion is manifested
through the terms of the original pledge agreement, in which the pledgee-bailee promised
to return the collateral once his interest was satisfied. In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956,
969 n.77 (D. Me. 1981). See supra note 100 (agreement gives rise to the pledgee-bailee's
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possession, he technically had not relinquished control over the post-per-
formance disposition of the collateral."°2 If a pledgor retains control over
property in which a purported pledgee has an interest, there can be no
perfected security interest under section 9-305. "3 Hence, Judge Cyr ar-
gued that the pledgor had to affirmatively give up his right of control
through the notification process and, furthermore, that this could have
been the only intended result under the "bailee with notice" provision of
section 9-305, where secondary security interests are involved. 10
It was at this point that Judge Cyr linked the control and bailment
modification arguments to strengthen his conclusion that notification of
the bailee in section 9-305 means notification by the pledgor. Judge Cyr
first argued that the pledgor had to give notice to the pledgee-bailee to
amend the original pledge agreement so that its terms were consistent
with a section 9-305 bailment. 05 He then concluded that in so doing, the
pledgor also simultaneously relinquished the right of "control" he tech-
nically had retained over the collateral by virtue of the original bailment
contract between himself and the pledgee-bailee.10 6
The key to Judge Cyr's argument lies in the conceptual purpose of
"notification."10 7 Section 9-305 of the U.C.C. and section 8 of the Re-
statement of Security both make the receipt of notification the critical
event that triggers an ipso facto possession in the secured party. 08 The
whole purpose of possession, however, is to provide the public with no-
tice of the new security interest.'0 9 Hence, Judge Cyr reasoned that be-
cause notification of a pledgee-bailee by itself affords no notice of the
junior pledgee's interest to creditors of the pledgor, the Code must have
intended something more to happen to trigger the critical event of "pos-
session. "0° For Judge Cyr, the only logical solution was to require noti-
fication by the pledgor-an event that simultaneously represents a
duty to return the collateral to the pledgor upon satisfaction of the debt obligation). More
accurately, however, the duty to return merely reflects that control over the equity cush-
ion never actually left the debtor. See Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 969 n.77.
102. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 966 & 969 n.77.
103. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text,
104. See Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 970. Judge Cyr arrives at this conclusion by reason-
ing that "if mere lack of possession in the debtor obviates the deceptive appearance of
dominion on the part of the debtor, why does UCC § 9-305 specifically refer to a 'bailee'
or, for that matter, require 'notification'?" Id. at 969.
105. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
106. See Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 970.
107. Id. at 969 (notification substitutes for possession in that it strips control of equity
cushion from pledgor).
108. Id. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Notice is essential to posses-
sion and perfection cannot occur prior to the secured party's acquisition of possession.
See Restatement of Security § 8, at 22 (1941). In other words, the execution of a security
agreement alone does not create a pledge. See id. § 10(2), at 28.
109. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
110. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 969 ("UCC § 9-305 makes the receipt of 'notification' of
the secured party's interest by a 'bailee' the critical event that triggers an ipso facto pos-
session in the secured party.") (footnotes omitted).
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pledgor's abdication of "control" and the acquisition of "possession" by
a junior pledgee."1' Once the junior pledgee has acquired true possession
through this transfer of control, future creditors presumably are pro-
tected from any attempts by the pledgor to portray the collateral as free
from encumbrances.
Although Judge Cyr's premise that notice from the pledgor serves to
relinquish the pledgor's control over collateral may be analytically cor-
rect, for all practical purposes the debtor's technical control over an "eq-
uity cushion" is irrelevant." 2
Although Judge Cyr asserted that the pledgor always retains control of
his equity interest in the collateral, even during the period in which the
senior pledgee is holding for himself, this theoretical retention of control
is not dispositive of whether the junior pledgee's "possession" is sufficient
to give him a perfected interest." 3 Although it is true that pre-Code se-
111. Judge Cyr stated:
Why then does UCC § 9-305 require 'notification' of the bailee? It can only
have been because notification has long been viewed as essential to the validity
of the nonpossessory pledge, a substitute for the actual possession which is in-
feasible in the circumstances. 'Notification' to the 'bailee' of the secured party's
interest under these circumstances means notification by the pledgor to the
bailee, because relinquishment by the pledgor of control over the disposition of
the collateral following performance is indispensable to the creation of a bail-
ment conformable with the requirements of UCC § 9-305 for the perfection of
the secondary pledge.
Id at 970 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
112. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
To the extent that Judge Cyr ignores the practical effect of notice from either the
pledgor or pledgee in favor of a conservative, perhaps more technically correct construc-
tion of § 9-305, his opinion is analogous to a minority of courts' narrow interpretation of
escrow in deciding that possession by an escrow agent generally is insufficient to perfect a
security interest. See e.g., Stein v. Rand Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); In re Dolly Madison Indus., 351 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd 480 F.2d
917 (1973).
Although technically "the simultaneous existence of an escrow and a pledge is a legal
impossibility" because a creditor cannot have absolute control over an escrow agent,
Dolly Madison, 351 F. Supp. at 1042, the majority of courts have held in favor of credi-
tors. A secured party cannot technically have common law "possession" when collateral
is held by an escrow agent because legally the agent is "controlled" only by the terms of
the escrow agreement, hence a secured party cannot have the "absolute dominion and
control" over the agent which is technically necessary to acquire a perfected possessory
security interest at common law. See id (during the time when the escrow agent is in
possession of collateral, "the escrow agent is not empowered to act for either party...
[and] his powers are solely limited to those stipulated in the escrow agreement"). Instead
of adopting the narrow common law concepts of control and possession, however, the
majority of courts that have addressed the issue focus on the debtor's lack of control,
rather than the secured party's perfect acquisition of it. As one court noted in the escrow
cases, to hold in favor of such a narrow construction would "elevate 'technicality over
substance and [negate] the reasonableness the Code hoped to impart to commercial prac-
tices.'" In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 151 (D. Del. 1975) (footnote omitted), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976). This observation rings true with
respect to the notice problems in the double-pledge situation as well. Instead of focusing
on whether the debtor himself technically releases control over collateral in the posses-
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curity law defined "possession" as control, the purpose behind the con-
trol requirement was to give the public notice of a secured party's
interest. 1 14
Section 1-102 of the U.C.C. states that the Code should be "liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and poli-
cies."'1 5 Those purposes and policies include not only public notice, but
also simplifying and modernizing the law governing commercial transac-
tions, and permitting the "continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.""' 6
Given that the primary purpose of Article 9 is its public notice func-
tion, 17 the analysis should not turn on whether the pledgor technically
retains a right of control over collateral by virtue of the fact that he has
not amended the terms of the original bailment contract. Rather, the
analysis should focus on the risk of misleading third party creditors with
respect to the status of the pledgor's equity interest in the collateral, It
is the pledgee's dissemination of the vital fact that a second pledge has
been created that really effectuates public notice, and that, by itself, has
nothing to do with the identity of the notice-giver.' '9 From a practical
standpoint, then, whether notice comes from the pledgor or the junior
pledgee is irrelevant because once a potential creditor discovers the exist-
ence of a first pledge he can always question the pledgee in possession
about the existence of other liens. 120
A second point can be made with respect to Judge Cyr's control analy-
sion of a pledgee-bailee, courts should see to what extent notice from a junior pledgee
serves the policies and purposes of the Code. See id. at 150-51.
114. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
115. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1978).
116. See id.
117. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
118. See DeKoven, U.C.C. Survey: Secured Transactions, 38 Bus. Law. 1195, 1214
(1983) wherein the author states in a discussion of Kontaratos:
The analysis should not turn upon the ... [identity of the] person who sends
notification to the bailee-pledgee. The analysis should instead focus upon the
risk of third parties being misled with respect to the status of the debtor's equity
in the stock .... Since an inquiring creditor would have to communicate with
the bailee-pledgee and since the bailee's possession prevents third parties from
assuming the absence of encumbrances, it would seem that the Code's purposes
are served.
See also IA Secured Transactions, supra note 21, § 6C.08[l], at 6C-124 n.346 ("Given the
diversity of common law approaches to possession, it would not be a meaningful exercise
for the courts to focus on whether a given arrangement under the Code satisfied all of the
intricacies that earlier decisions have required." Instead, argues the author, the courts
should focus on whether it "gave adequate [public] notice of the security interest.").
119. See supra note 118.
120. See In re Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649, 652 (W.D. Mich. 1968)
("If one inquired of [the pledgee in possession], he would not only obtain information of
[his] secured interest but also that of [the junior creditors]. Thus, possession in one se-
cured party should give notice to all secured interests known to the party having posses-
sion.").
An important assumption underlying Judge Cyr's analysis in Kontaratos is that a
pledgee-bailee simply will ignore notice from a junior pledgee, and hence only informa-
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sis. If his premise that the junior interest can attach only to the pledgor's
equity interest is correct, then arguably the junior pledgee cannot perfect
his interest through any form of possession. An equity interest conceiva-
bly can be classified as an intangible, 2 ' and under section 9-302 of the
tion transmitted directly by the debtor satisfies the public notice function. See In re
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 967 (D. Me. 1981).
The assumption that reliance upon the junior pledgee's notice threatens the public no-
tice function of section 9-305 is consistent with Judge Cyr's control argument. See supra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text. If the premise that only the debtor can relinquish
control over the collateral is accepted, then since control equals possession, and posses-
sion alone satisfies the public notice function, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text, only the debtor's notice can serve the Code's public notice function. Contrary to
Judge Cyr's assumptions, however, relying on the junior pledgee's notice to serve the
public notice function is sound for a number of reasons.
First, in stating that notice from either the pledgor or the pledgee was sufficient to
perfect an interest, it is clear that courts and commentators were never concerned about
the equally real possibility of an ordinary bailee ignoring notice from a pledgee in the
pure bailment situation. See supra notes 44-45 & 83 and accompanying text (notice alone
sufficient to trigger possession). Second, to assume that a pledgee-bailee will simply ig-
nore notice of a junior security interest or, worse, lie about its existence is to ignore the
general good faith requirement embodied in every provision of the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-
102(3) (1978). Under U.C.C. § 1-201(19), "good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned." Judge Cyr briefly acknowledges the good faith
requirement, but states only that "[ilt would not seem dishonest for an alleged bailee in
the present circumstances, after performance by the pledgor, to return the securities to
the pledgor as agreed." Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 967 n.61. Once again, however, this
concern never motivated courts and commentators with respect to pure bailees, and it is
clear that notice can come from a pledgee in the pure bailment situation. Moreover, it is
clear that an ordinary bailee is liable in damages for the wrongful delivery of collateral.
See Smith v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 47 Or. App. 887, 895, 615 P.2d 1097, 1102 (1980);
Restatement of Torts (Second) §§ 223, 224 (1965); cf. Restatement of Security, §§ 22-24
(1941) (discussing pledgee liability); U.C.C. § 8-318 (1978) (bailees not liable for innocent
conversion or participation in breach of fiduciary duty, but concept of good faith includes
the objective element of observing "reasonable commercial standards"). Finally, one
commentator has suggested that even in the double-pledge situation, a properly notified
pledgee-bailee would be under a "duty to respect the junior lender's rights and would be
liable in conversion if he failed to do so." See Article 8, supra note 53, at 906. But see
Investment Securities; supra note 43, at 1030-31. Thus, the junior pledgee's notice satis-
fies the public notice function equally as well as notice from the debtor, whether the
bailee being notified is a pledgee-bailee or a pure bailee.
121. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1978) defines "general intangibles" as "any personal prop-
erty (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents,
instruments, and money." Arguably the "equity cushion" that Judge Cyr describes,
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 969 n.77 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981), is an intangible because it
represents a right in the collateral, and not the actual asset itself. In fact, the pledgor may
never have possession of the actual asset again, should he default and the pledgee-bailee
sell the asset. In such case, the pledgor would have an interest not in the disposed asset,
but in the surplus remaining after the proceeds of the sale had been applied to the
pledgee's interest. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978); In re Barnes Freight Line, Inc., 29
Bankr. 664, 668 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (holding that language in the financing statement: "all
other.., obligations... in whatever form owing to Debtor from any person" sufficiently
described an "account" under U.C.C. § 9-106, thereby enabling the secured party to have
a perfected security interest in proceeds of an auction sale of debtor's property by senior
creditor); cf Heinicke Instruments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir.
1976) (holding that rights in stock were general intangibles until certificates were actually
issued).
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Code intangibles can only be perfected through filing. 122 Thus, when
Judge Cyr's argument is taken apart and its components analyzed, it fails
to support the new construction of section 9-305 that he proposes.
Therefore, in arguing for a new construction of section 9-305, Judge Cyr
lays the analytical groundwork for the undoing of his own argument.
B. Protection of the Debtor from Interference by Fraudulent
Claimants
A final argument that may be raised for requiring notice to come from
the debtor is that the 1977 amendments to Article 8 of the U.C.C. com-
pel such a conclusion.
Article 8 of the U.C.C. governs the relationships, rights and duties of
issuers of both certificated and uncertificated investment securities and
the parties that deal with such securities. 123 In 1977 existing sections of
Article 8 were revised and new ones were drafted to govern the creation,
perfection and termination of security interests in all securities, certifi-
cated and uncertificated. 124
New section 8-313(l)(h) applies where a security interest is perfected
by notice to a third party holding the securities, and is intended as the
Article 8 counterpart to section 9-305. 125 Unlike section 9-305, however,
which requires only notification, section 8-313(1)(h) further requires that
122. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1978).
123. See U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1978).
124. Prior to 1977, the creation and perfection of security interests in certificated se-
curities were subject to the provisions of Article 9. As of 1987, twenty-six states, includ-
ing New York, have adopted the 1977 revisions of Article 8. See Ark Stat. Ann. § 85-8-
101 to -8-408 (Supp. 1986); Cal. Com. Code § 8101-8408 (West Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 4-8-101 to -8-408 (Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42a-8-101 to -8-408
(West Supp. 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 8-101 to -408 (Supp. 1986); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 490:8-101 to -408 (Supp. 1984); Idaho Code § 28-8-101 to -408 (Supp. 1986); Kan.
U.C.C. Ann. § 84-8-101 to -408 (Vernon Supp. 1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.8-102 to
-408 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 8-101 to -408
(Supp. 1986); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 106, § 8-101 to -408 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp.
1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.8-101 to -408 (West Supp. 1987); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-8-
101 to -408 (1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 104.8101-.8408 (Michie 1986); N.Y. U.C.C.
Law § 8-101 to -408 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 41-08-01 to -44 (1983 &
Supp. 1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 8-101 to -408 (West Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 78.1010-4060 (1984); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-8-101 to -408 (Supp. 1986);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-101 to -408 (Supp. 1986); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.101-
.408 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 8.8-101-.8-408 (Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 62A.8-101-.8-408 (Supp. 1987); W. Va. Code § 46-8-101 to -408 (Supp.
1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 408.101-.408 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-21-801 to
-877 (Supp. 1986).
Section 8-321 governs the enforceability, attachment, perfection and termination of
security interests in both types of investment securities, see U.C.C. § 8-321 & official
comment 1 (1978), and section 8-313 lists the various ways of transferring such securities
for the purpose of perfecting security interests therein. See U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(a)-(j).
125. See Modern Security-Holding Practices, supra note 43, at 296 ("In a broad sense,
Section 8-313(1) is Article 8's analogue to Section 9-305, which deals with what might be
termed constructive possession."); U.C.C. § 8-313 official comment 3 (1978) ("Paragraph
(h) is analogous to Section 9-305 . . ").
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the notification be signed by the debtor transferring the security inter-
est.1 26 According to the revisors, the purpose behind requiring notifica-
tion to be signed by the debtor is to reduce the possibility of interference
by fraudulent claimants.
1 27
The prevention of fraud is a valid and compelling reason for requiring
that notification be both in writing and signed by the debtor, and several
commentators implicitly have treated Article 8 as another signpost along
the way towards requiring that notice come from the pledgor himself. 28
The requirement of a signed writing, however, does not necessarily
preclude notice from a junior pledgee in any analytical sense. Although
some commentators have interpreted section 8-313(l)(h) to mean that
notice must actually be sent by the debtor,I29 subsection (h) provides that
the notification also may consist of a copy of the security agreement be-
tween the debtor and the secured party. 30 To the extent that the presen-
tation of a signed security agreement to a bailee by anyone satisfies the
purposes of section 8-313, subsection (h) does not necessarily compel a
126. See Appendix I, Reasons for 1977 Change, § 8-313, at 831 (1978). Compare
U.C.C. § 8-313(h) (notice must be in writing and signed by the debtor) with U.C.C. § 9-
305 (perfection occurs upon bailee's mere receipt of any form of notice) (1978).
127. See Appendix I, Reasons for 1977 Change, § 8-313, at 831-32 (1978). See Article
8, supra note 53, at 905 ("[I]n order to prevent interference with the debtor's rights with-
out his consent, paragraph (h) requires a 'written notification... signed by the debtor.'")
(quoting U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(h) (1978)).
128. See, e.g., U.C.C Survey, supra note 50, at 1185, wherein Professor Martin Aron-
stein, one of the principal architects of the new Article 8, asserts: "As observed earlier in
this article, the 1977 Amendments should have the effect of eliminating the uncertainty
generated by [Kontaratos]. The general concept of notification to a bailee embodied in
section 9-305 is replaced by an explicit statement in new section 8-313(1)(h) .... ." Hence
Aronstein concludes:
How can the owner effectively pledge his security as collateral for a loan?
Under section 9-305, he can apparently give his lender a perfected security in-
terest by notifying the bailee of his security.... Under new sections 8-313 (1)(h)
and 8-321(2), a security interest is perfected by the owner giving written notice
to the bank.
Id. at 1183. See also C. Israels & E. Guttman, Modem Securities Transfers § 4.02, at S.4-
49 (Supp. 1985) (discussing U.C.C. § 9-305 interwoven with discussion of Article 8 deliv-
eries of securities wherein authors state that where security is held by bailee, "notice of a
pledge of the security must be given in writing by the pledgor").
129. See supra note 128.
130. U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(h)(ii) provides:
Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein
to a purchaser occurs only: (h) with respect to the transfer of a security interest
where the debtor has signed a security agreement containing a description of the
security, at the time a written notification, which, in the case of the creation of
the security interest, is signed by the debtor (which may be a copy of the security
agreement)... is received by... (ii) a third person, not a financial intermedi-
ary, in possession of the security....
U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(h)(ii) (1978) (emphasis added). See also Haydock, When is a Broker a
Bailee or Is an Interest in Securities a General Intangible?, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 10, 22 (1981)
(discussing requirements of U.C.C. § 8-313). It should be noted that as in U.C.C. § 9-
305, the focus of this section is on the third party's receipt of notice. The section was
written in the passive voice, and it is by no means clear that the debtor himself must
physically send the written notification, just as § 9-305 is unclear on the origin of notice.
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finding that notice actually must be sent by the debtor. 3'
A final argument against requiring notice to come only from the
pledgor is that such a requirement ultimately violates a basic precept of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The U.C.C. generally charges a secured
party with the task of doing all that is necessary to perfect his own secur-
ity interest. 32 It is the secured party who files and who takes posses-
sion. 133  It is somewhat of an anomaly, then, to turn over the
responsibility of perfecting a security interest to the pledgor in cases in
which a junior interest has been created.
More important, however, is the reason behind placing the task of
perfection in the hands of the secured party. The pledgor simply does
not have the same interest in taking the necessary steps to perfect a se-
cured party's interest as does the secured party. It is not the pledgor but
the pledgee who risks losing his interest in the collateral in a priority
dispute if that interest is not perfected. 34 Thus, it is hardly in the
pledgor's interest to perfect with urgency and precision. 135 In fact, when
there is a negative pledge clause in the original security agreement, it
would be contrary to the pledgor's interests to send notice of a junior
security interest to the pledgee-bailee. 136
In light of these arguments, it seems extremely unwise and contrary to
the U.C.C. to require notice from the pledgor in a double-pledge situa-
tion as the only effective means of perfecting a junior security interest.
Therefore, for purposes of perfecting a junior security interest in collat-
131. See Investment Securities, supra note 43, at 1028 (discussing new U.C.C. § 8-313,
author states only that "unlike section 9-305, there must be a security agreement signed
by the debtor, and notification of the security interest must be received by the person who
might be said to be in control of the security") (emphasis added).
132. See U.C.C. § 9-301 official comment 1 (1978) ("A security interest is 'perfected'
when the secured party has taken whatever steps are necessary to give him such an inter-
est.") (emphasis added). See supra note 12.
133. See U.C.C. § 9-303 official comment 2 (1978) (example shows secured party tak-
ing all necessary steps to perfect their security interest); U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (interest in
money or instruments perfected only by "the secured party's taking possession') (empha-
sis added); id. § 9-403(2)-(3) (secured party responsible for filing continuation statements
to keep his perfected interest).
134. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. The priority race goes to the
swiftest, thus each secured party wants to be in charge of perfecting his own security
interest. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a)-(b); U.C.C. § 9-312 official comment 5 (Example 2)
(1978) (the result that first to perfect takes priority "may be regarded as an adoption...
of the idea, deeply rooted at common law, of a race of diligence among creditors").
Moreover, if the secured party's interest remains unperfected, it is subordinated to the
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Thus, to the
extent a pledgor is in financial straits at the time he grants a security interest, there is a
clear disincentive for him to take the necessary steps to perfect that interest.
135. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
136. Since the grant of a second security interest by the pledgor would be a condition
of default under those circumstances, see In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 958 (D. Me.
1981), clearly no pledgor would want to send notice of the junior pledgee's security inter-
est. See also supra note 94 (discussing consequences of grant of second security interest
when there is a negative pledge clause in the original pledge agreement).
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eral under section 9-305, notification still should be allowed to come
from either the pledgor or the junior pledgee.
CONCLUSION
Although the arguments presented for holding that notice must come
from the pledgor are persuasive and logically appealing, requiring notice
of a junior interest to come exclusively from the pledgor is an unsound
approach for a number of compelling legal and practical reasons. The
better position is that notice to a pledgee-bailee may be given by either
the pledgor or the junior pledgee.
Furthermore, although requiring notice from the pledgor may satisfy
concerns about fraudulent claimants, such concerns do not automatically
preclude notice from the junior pledgee. For example, the practice actu-
ally followed in Kontaratos should have laid to rest any worries of the
pledgee-bailee about the validity of the junior interest. In Kontaratos,
the junior pledgee not only notified the pledgee-bailee of his interest but
also included full documentation of all the original loan papers signed by
himself and the pledgor.137
Perhaps requiring the presentation of written loan documentation is
the wave of the future, with respect to perfecting junior interests. It pro-
vides the pledgee-bailee with some assurance of the validity of the second
security interest, and thereby limits interference by fraudulent claim-
ants.138 As section 8-313(1)(h) implicitly makes clear, however, the jun-
ior pledgee is as capable of sending copies of loan documentation as the
pledgor. Thus, until Article 9 follows Article 8 with respect to requiring
written notification signed by the debtor or copies of loan documenta-
tion,139 section 9-305 should not be read as requiring notice from the
pledgor as the only effective means of perfecting a junior interest. To do
so would both open up a trap for the unwary creditor and ignore the
underlying purposes and policies of the Code itself."4
Sheila W. Sawyer
137. Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. at 964.
138. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
139. U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(h) (1978).
140. Clearly the drafters of section 9-305 would have been more careful in drafting the
notice to bailee provision if they had intended such a result. Furthermore, when the
Permanent Editorial Board met to revise Article 8 in the late 1970's, they also considered
revising comparable sections of Article 9 but chose against such revisions. See Article 8,
supra note 53, at 903.
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